In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses the relation between teachers and students during his treatment of "non-uniform friends." These friends exchange goods differing in kind (e.g., something useful is exchanged for pleasure). Such friendships depend on the needs of the friends, and we are invited to ask whether some need induces a philosopher to teach a not-yet-philosophical student. In this paper I argue that the philosophical teacher does not approach his pupil out of need nor as he would approach a contemplative friend who is an equal. The teacher chooses to benefit students as a morally virtuous human being would, although not as if his happiness depends upon their success in learning. A teacher is not an ordinary benefactor, intent upon seeing his power made actual in some other person. Aristotle's philosophical teachers seem to be simultaneously more generous and less interested in their students.
makes the effort to help others understand. To aim at influencing others is not to aim at contemplation. 2 There is no need to presuppose that Aristotle has a single goal in all of his writing or that he must be contemplative always because his Nicomachean Ethics presents that as the best activity.
3 Nevertheless, we should look for some account of how Aristotle understands the relation between the contemplative life and the non-contemplative activities (such as teaching and writing) in which he was evidently engaged. We can gain some light, I claim, from his discussion of friendship, in which he shows how a contemplative life engages us in common with others. Elsewhere I argue that, contrary to the apparent conclusion of book X, Aristotle should be understood as holding that the best human life is not that of a solitary sage but the sharing of speech and thought enjoyed by contemplative friends. 4 At present, I set aside the case of the philosopher and his intellectual equal in order to consider how a contemplative human being relates to the non-philosophical or the not-yet-philosophical people with whom he speaks and, presumably, for whom he writes.
I. Introduction
In Nicomachean Ethics book IX, chapter 1, Aristotle discusses the relation between teachers and students, a topic addressed nowhere else in the books on friendship. He considers 2 Aristotle presents the contemplative life as undertaken for its own sake and as perfective of the one living that life. This makes it unlike the art of medicine, which is devoted to the good of the patient or to the preservation of the art in the training of the next generation of physicians. The idea that the contemplative seeks immortality in a manner analogous to the animal species, viz., by producing intellectual offspring, is difficult to square with Aristotle's text. 3 Richard F. Hassing argues that Aristotle is more interested in shaping the opinions and attitudes of politically influential Athenians than he is in describing the contemplative life in a way that is straightforwardly accurate ("The Question of Self-Reference in Nicomachean Ethics VI," a paper given in the 2003 Fall Lecture Series at The Catholic University of America). Accordingly, Aristotle's goals in the Nicomachean Ethics itself may not be simply contemplative, and the depiction therein of the wise human being may be distorted in some respects. three cases: (1) Protagoras and his students, (2) the sophists and their students, and (3) those who share philosophy as teacher and student. All three appear to be instances of the sorts of friendship Aristotle examines in this chapter: "non-uniform friends" (anomoioeideis philiai), which translators render variously as "dissimilar friends," "heterogeneous friends," friends "not of a single form," or even "hybrid friends." These friends exchange goods that differ in kind, such as when one friend provides something useful, and the other provides pleasure (cf.
VIII.6.1158b3-5). Aristotle introduces these friendships as founded in the needs of the friends, which invites us to consider the possibility that a teacher of philosophy might trade philosophy or knowledge for some other good, such as money or honor. In this light, the fact that a philosopher teaches might suggest the insufficiency of philosophy itself to secure human wellbeing. In this paper I argue that Aristotle distinguishes the relations between teachers of philosophy and their students from other friendships founded in need. He does not deny that the person capable of teaching philosophy has other needs, but he does make it clear that the teaching of philosophy is not essentially an exchange of something high for something low.
In chapter 1 of book IX, which has the marks of a textually unified whole set off from its neighboring chapters, 5 Aristotle addresses difficulties attaching to what I will call non-uniform friendship. Without fully developing the specific nature of this friendship, he proceeds almost immediately to the complaints that occur within it. This friendship exhibits some undeniable similarities to and some apparent overlap with the earlier treatment (beginning in VIII.7) of friendships characterized by superiority. 6 The chapter could easily appear to be separated from 5 Aristotle concludes the final chapter of book VIII with the words, "So then, this much should be said about these matters" (1163b27-28), and he begins chapter 2 of book IX with the words, "Such matters as the following also contain difficulties" (1164b22). 6 Pakaluk (NE VIII and IX, 149) begins his discussion of the first chapter by noting the incompleteness of the treatment and the imperfect separation of what appears to be the focus of this chapter (relationships focused on exchange of things that differ in kind and that appear to be incommensurable as opposed to the exchange of useful items, which can be measured in common by money) from some material in the preceding chapters.
the other material simply due to poor organization. The ambiguity between twelve and fifteen arises because it is not clear how to count non-uniform friendships between unequals. Gauthier and Jolif produce a chart with four quadrants. In one quadrant are the first three types of friendship, which are homogeneous and between equals. In another quadrant are the three homogeneous friendships marked by superiority (the friendship of the more virtuous to the less virtuous, and so on). The text in IX.1 suggests two more quadrants: heterogeneous friendships between equals and heterogeneous friendships between unequals. The friendships in this last quadrant would obtain between three pairs: the virtuous and the useful; the pleasant and the useful; and the pleasant and the virtuous. The difficulty is whether the friendship between the person who is more virtuous in relation to the person who is less useful is the same kind of friendship as that between the person who is less virtuous in relation to the person who is more useful. Reading the text as Gauthier and Jolif do adds at least six and as many as nine new kinds of friendship to the six kinds already distinguished. 9 Pakaluk writes, "It is difficult to see what the structure or dialectic of the chapter is, and some passages seem simply to repeat what was said in earlier chapters (e.g. 1164a20-3 and 1159a14-15)" (NE Books VIII and IX, 149) . Pakaluk does not surrender to this difficulty and avoids interpreting Aristotle as simply repeating himself. He tries to find something specific to the exchanges between non-uniform friends throughout the chapter.
three paradigmatic forms, and yet they do not essentially involve the sorts of superiority and inferiority Aristotle had been discussing in the last chapters of book VIII. 10 At the same time, it proves extremely difficult to keep the latter two categories of friendships distinct. In fact, book IX uses the same kinds of examples of friends that also appear in book VIII, chapter 8: lover and beloved, poor and rich, and even uneducated and learned; both passages also refer to the relation between children and parents and that between human beings and gods. More important, he appeals to the same principle as the animating core of at least some of the friendships discussed in each passage. In book VIII, he describes these friendships between contrary types as somehow centered on exchange, and he explains, "For whatever anyone happens to need, because he aims at this, he gives something else in return" (VIII.8.1159b14-15). We find this same principle reasserted in IX.1 in an almost identical form.
11
To sum this up, I note that Aristotle gives a separate treatment in book IX to matters already treated to some extent in book VIII and probably able to be incorporated there. In the second treatment, he ignores any superiority of one friend to the other and concentrates instead on the difficulties of achieving a proportionate equality in the items exchanged by the friends.
Furthermore, he addresses for the only time in these books the friendship between teachers and students, and he speaks specifically of teachers of philosophy. Aristotle ended the chapter immediately preceding IX.1 by announcing the completion of his discussion of the complaints or quarrels that arise in friendships based on superiority (see note 5 above). By discussing teachers 10 See VIII.6.1158b1-5: "The aforementioned friendships, then, depend on an equality, since each gets the same things from the other, and they wish the same things to each other. (Or they exchange different things, such as pleasure for help; but that these are friendships to a lesser degree and are less enduring has been said.)" This occurs near the end of chapter six, just before Aristotle turns to friendships based on superiority. In this text, then, he suggests non-uniform and equal friends, but he does so as if he does not anticipate that he will give that class another treatment in book IX. 11 "For it is what he happens to need that he is intent upon, and it is for the sake of that, that he will give up these things" (1164a20-22). (I return to this passage below.) and students under the heading of non-uniform friends rather than as friends characterized by superiority and inferiority, he invites us to consider this friendship specifically in terms of what they exchange.
II. A Reading of Book IX, Chapter 1
Non-uniform friends are brought together by some lack or need, and, when the friendships are successful, they are equalized by finding some proportionate exchange. Aristotle focuses on the complaints that arise when these exchanges disappoint the friends. At the opening and the conclusion of the chapter he appeals to money as a common measure for equalizing at least many such exchanges. 12 Between the two references to measuring exchanges with money, he considers especially two kinds of relationship: (1) that between lover and beloved and (2) that between teacher and student. Between his remarks on these two cases he announces a principle that seems to be operative in all these sorts of friendships: "For it is what he happens to need that he is intent upon, and it is for the sake of that, that he will give up these things" (1164a20-22).
This thesis re-formulates the principle first identified in VIII.8 (1159b14-15), and it serves to emphasize the centrality of need or at least of the interest in acquiring what one lacks. For, when
Aristotle discusses these friendships, he considers them almost exclusively from the point of view of those who enter the friendship as a way of meeting needs.
In non-uniform friendship, at most one party acts virtuously, which at least means not in order to gain something. As captured in the principle just quoted, others enter into this friendship as the means to the satisfaction of a felt need. Aristotle's point here seems to be that non-uniform 12 Pakaluk suggests, correctly in my judgment, that Aristotle is contrasting the friendships under discussion with commercial transactions, in which money serves as the common measure for things that seem very different in kind.
The friendships under discussion here differ from what Aristotle describes in V.5 (1133a13-33), despite the attempts of some to measure even wisdom with money.
friendships are inherently unstable because the friends are engaged with one another on dissimilar terms. One friend acts virtuously, and the other strives to be useful, or one friend acts usefully, and the other aims to please. One difficulty is that within this chapter and elsewhere
Aristotle distinguishes friendships rooted in need from those based on virtue. Virtuous friends do not complain because they do good without anticipation of return (1164a33-b2 and 1162b6-8).
Even in these non-uniform friendships, they will not be looking for an equal return, unless they have ceased acting nobly and have begun to act out of desire of gain. expect can or will gratify our needs, but when events make these errors plain, the friendship collapses, and our disappointment at not getting what we expected is intensified by the bitterness or enmity we feel toward the person we had trusted.
Even if one friend acts virtuously and not on the condition that he receives some equivalent return, the other party acts in anticipation of gain. Accordingly, the relationships themselves reflect people's success or failure in estimating the worth of various goods and determining where they might be obtained. Inability to negotiate the difference between the genuine and the merely apparent good may lead to a poorly chosen friendship that almost certainly must end in frustration, resentment, or even a sense of betrayal. As Aristotle puts it, "It is like nothing is coming to you at all, when you fail to obtain what you are aiming to get" (1164a14-15). And people do aim to gain something through the friendship in accord with the principle already quoted: "For it is what he happens to need that he is intent upon, and it is for the sake of that, that he will give up these things" (1164a20-22).
These friendships turn on judgments regarding the worth of the items exchanged.
Consequently, it hardly seems accidental that, just after drawing attention to the importance of discerning judgment (1164a22-23), Aristotle introduces the relations between teachers and students. He begins with Protagoras, who taught students and then accepted in payment whatever the student thought the teaching was worth. Protagoras's most famous teaching-that man is the measure of all things-would seem to require this approach. His teaching is worth whatever it seems like it is worth, or, at least, that is its worth according to his teaching. This charming consistency between theory and practice reveals Protagoras as the man who never quarrels, indeed, as the man who could never feel cheated. He could not claim that what he gave was worth more than his student thought it was worth. To put an end to the types of quarrels that destroy friendships, we seem to need to embrace Protagoreanism. If we do not become Protagoreans, we must sift through differing opinions on the genuine and the relative worth of goods, and we must not be cowed into thinking that persisting disagreement renders the search for good judgment futile. Furthermore, Protagoras's teaching that man is the measure recalls Aristotle's prior claim in this chapter that money has been invented as "a common measure, and so everything is referred to this and measured by this" (1164a1-2). At first, Protagoras's teaching seems to conflict with this principle (insofar as man, not money, is the measure), but Protagoras also allows money to measure his teaching, and so consumerism, understood as the commodification of all goods, might be simply one way of implementing Protagoreanism.
Even if Protagoras never quarrels, other people do, and by quarrelling they show they think others both can and do judge falsely. The sophists exhibit one alternative to Protagoreanism. The sophists also allow their teaching to be measured by money, but they require payment in advance because only in this way can they entice their students to an inflated estimation of its worth. When students have received the teaching, they can no longer be deluded regarding its worth. Aristotle remarks acerbically and somewhat implausibly that no one would pay for what they actually teach.
He turns then to philosophical teachers, who are distinguished in at least three important respects. One of these must be examined at some length, after which the other two may be stated more briefly. First, Aristotle likens philosophical teachers to virtuous friends. The virtuous give gifts for the benefit of their friends and not in order to acquire something in return. Protagoras and the sophists relate to their students on different terms, according to which one friend owes a benefit equivalent to the advantage gained through the friend's assistance. As Aristotle explains, the value of a rich man's gift is not determined by the fact that it has cost him little, but by the actual benefit it produces for the recipient. In Aristotle's view, then, the sophist's student would owe nothing or little in return for their teaching, no matter the effort or the time required to convey it. Virtuous friends deserve a different sort of recompense. A virtuous friend gives without designs for an equal return. He would not complain even if there were no return, but the appropriate return is recompense in accord with the choice of the giver (1164b1-2), as distinct from something equivalent in worth to the benefit received (see VIII.13.1163a21-23).
Aristotle does not elaborate to clarify what this standard means, but we may say at least that it points us away from the actual benefit of the gift and toward the nobility of the giver's action. To focus on the giver's choice means, we would say, to recognize that the giver meant well, that he gave generously and in a way that is mindful of the other. If we take the example of two wealthy friends who have the virtue of generosity, when one gives the other a gift, the point is not the benefit derived from having received it and not the monetary expense incurred, but the consideration and thoughtfulness of the choice that animates the giving. Aristotle says, "Thus it seems also for those who have shared philosophy" (1164b2-3). The context seems to require that this not be interpreted as the sharing of philosophy between equal contemplative friends (e.g., IX.12.1172a1-8); nor does it seem best understood as referring to a public presentation of philosophy designed to affect citizens morally or to enhance the political standing of philosophy.
Instead, this seems to be the unequal relation of teacher and student, and that relation in a particularly imperfect form because Aristotle is speaking about teacher and student as nonuniform friends, i.e., not as friends who share the same kind of good (philosophy) in greater and lesser measures. He is speaking about teachers who have chosen to share philosophy with those who can offer in exchange only something different in kind.
To the extent that the teacher of philosophy is like a virtuous friend, the teacher chooses to act not for his own advantage but for the benefit of the student. 14 We might say that Aristotle asks the student not to try to repay something equal to what was given, but to acknowledge the generosity in sharing philosophy. The teacher deserves recompense that recognizes the specific character of the choice he made. 15 Aristotle contrasts the teacher's choice with those choices made "on a condition," that is, choices where someone confers a favor with expectation of some return. The no-strings-attached character of the teacher's choice simultaneously underlines the teacher's generosity and precludes the teacher from indulging in self-pitying resentment if students fail to make a display of honor or gratitude in return.
14 In Aristotle's view, the virtuous friend has not simply ceased to care about his own good. When he assigns benefit to his friend he knows that his choice is noble, and he understands that nobility is better than benefit. That does not yet make this choice an exchange of one good for another, nor does it unmask the virtuous giver as a man who outwits his friend and takes advantage of him. In Aristotle's example, the giver gains the noble good by choosing the advantageous good for his friend. To borrow Robert Sokolowski's language (see Moral Action: A Phenomenological Study [Indiana University Press, 1985] ), the giver seeks the good of his friend as good for himself. This is not crypto-selfishness. As Aristotle works out the difference between exchange friendships and virtuous friendships, he exploits ambiguities in the word "good." The result is that the virtuous man is neither foolishly seeking only what is good for others, nor is he always selfishly seeking his own advantage. 15 See VIII.13.1163a21-23, and compare with IX.1.1164a33-b6.
The philosophical teacher's activity comes to light as, so to speak, self-contained, in a manner analogous to other morally virtuous activity. Aristotle does not make the excellence of a courageous deed in battle dependent on victory or on saving the city from danger, and he does not locate the goodness of liberality in its effective alleviation of others' material deprivation. If teaching is like that, its nobility lies essentially in the choice made by the teacher and not in the benefit actually received by students. The teacher acts for the benefit of the student, but Aristotle emphasizes the teacher's choice instead of the effective conferral of benefit. There is something abstract about isolating teaching from learning too purely, but there is also a point to be preserved. One part of the point is the non-instrumentalization of the teacher, 16 and another part is the independent and indispensable agency of the student. The teacher cannot guarantee success, and one must acknowledge that, even if that teacher is open to success in every case, considerable obstacles stand in the way of successful philosophical teaching.
After this lengthy discussion of the first point, we can consider more briefly two additional respects in which Aristotle distinguishes philosophical teachers from Protagoras and sophists. First, by denying that philosophy can be measured by money, he removes from this relationship what other teachers accept for their teaching. Second, Aristotle assimilates this relationship to that obtaining between gods and human beings (cf. VIII.7) and parents and children. These are both relationships characterized by superiority; gods and parents have bestowed what Aristotle calls the greatest goods: existence, sustenance, and education from birth (VIII.12.1162a4-9) . And yet, just after comparing teachers to gods and parents, he says that no one owes everything to any one person-not to one's father and not even to Zeus (see 16 Compare Nietzsche's remark: "Whoever is a teacher through and through (von Grund) takes all things seriously only in relation to his students-even himself" (Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann [New York: Random House, 1966] , 79 [aphorism #63]). Aristotle's philosophical teacher seems not to be a teacher "through and through." I am grateful to Jeff Black for drawing this connection to my attention.
initiating one into the best life, and the student should recognize that this is what the teacher has chosen to make available. 17 The teacher gives the very best there is for human beings, and yet, as I argue below, the teacher is not primarily a teacher.
The comparison to gods and parents reinforces the claim of the teacher to a kind of independence and superiority. All three are owed a debt that cannot be adequately repaid (VIII.14.1163b12-18). Parents, mothers in particular, constitute a paradigm for generous love, and they pour out their attentions on children because they are their own. Teachers, by contrast, would apparently offer their teaching to anyone who would receive it. Teachers thus seem to be in one sense less discriminating, not to say prodigal, and yet they show less devotion to individuals than do mothers.
Aristotle tells us why parents love their children despite their not being useful, pleasant, or good, but he does not tell us why his philosophical teachers act benevolently and in the manner of friends toward students. The philosophical teacher is not related to his pupil as he would be to a contemplative friend who is an equal. Because they are not in the relevant respect "good people alike in virtue" (VIII.3.1156b7-8), they are not equal in their capacities for philosophical activity. The teacher enjoys a decisive superiority over his pupil, and he chooses with respect to the student as a morally virtuous human being would. Aristotle does not say why the teacher does so. One reason that might incline us to believe that no philosopher would make this choice is that it might seem to make him not a contemplative but a practical human being, even a productive human being. As Aristotle puts it in Physics: "Teaching is the activity of a person who can teach, yet the operation is performed on some patient" . Like building or cooking, teaching is a movement that aims to terminate in an end distinct from and better than itself. 20 Insofar as teaching is productive, the teacher becomes subordinated to the well-being of the learner. Why would the philosopher turn away from his own immanent, contemplative activity and subject himself, as if he were a menial laborer, to the uncertain task of benefiting another?
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle presents the life of the king as the busy life of seeking to benefit others through action (VIII.11.1161a10-22 and VIII.10.1160b1-6 The second suggestion emerges from Aristotle's comparison of teachers to gods.
Aristotle's God does not engage in active benevolence or providential care for human beings, and yet, by being accessible to our understanding through the intelligible order of nature, his God may be described as contributing to human happiness. While non-human things might be described metaphorically as loving God (Met. XII.7.1072b3), human beings can become aware of God's perfection, and this intelligibility to us amounts to a kind of natural benevolence. The excellence of divine self-sufficiency appears to us, and in that light we discern the contemplative life as the closest human approximation to divine self-sufficiency. The best human life is the life according to nature, which is intelligible in its dependence on God's perfection. God is available to us for imitation, and, similarly, the philosophical teacher is available to students, although not as if his happiness depends upon their success in learning. Somewhat like God and without loss to his own happiness, the philosophical teacher is able to give students access to the life that is best according to nature. Perhaps it cannot be proved that this is Aristotle's understanding, but this just might be the choice made by the philosophical teacher.
22 See IX.3.1165b26-36.
In conclusion, I turn to Augustine for a historical contrast. Augustine's mother, Monica, hounded him for years before Augustine finally converted to Christianity. She wept, prayed, fasted, and nagged until he ordered his life in a way akin to what she thought best. Indeed, her happiness and peace of mind were intricately bound up with the character of Augustine's life. It is impossible to imagine Aristotle with anything approaching this attitude toward some exceptionally talented but wayward student. Aristotle's prolific writing demonstrates the absence of stinginess, but his happiness consists in his contemplative activity, perhaps with equal friends, not in the training of students. As a teacher and a writer, Aristotle is benevolent but not servile or acquisitive, and he acts more in the mode of a final or an exemplar cause than in the mode of an efficient or productive cause.
N.B.: A different version of this paper, which was entitled "Aristotle on Friendship and Teaching Philosophy," was delivered at St. John's College in Annapolis, Maryland, on 25 October 2013. The present version of the paper reflects refinements made in light of comments by John W. Peck, S.J., at the ACPA conference in Indianapolis on 2 November 2013. I am grateful to him for his careful consideration of the paper and to others who offered questions or comments.
